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Abstract 
 
We assess monetary convergence preceding the implementation of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) through Kalman filtering estimates of the risk premium of 
eleven forward exchange rates of European and non-European currencies. Since all 
participating currencies are in effect identical from inception of a currency union, the 
convergence process to such an identical status should be reflected in the participating 
currencies' risk premiums prior to monetary union implementation. Starting from this 
assumption, we show the paths followed by the participating currencies towards 
monetary union. We find that the co-movements of risk premiums among the preced-
ing European Monetary System (EMS) currencies differ across time periods but dis-
play a tendency to convergence to the German mark’s risk premium up to EMU im-
plementation. The paper also shows a clear pattern of asymmetry of the participating 
currencies in relation to the German mark.  
 
 
JEL classification: F02, F31, F33, F36, G15, G18 
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Non technical Summary 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between European and non-European 
currencies' risk premium in the period preceding European monetary integration. The 
study of these relationships is interesting because it can provide a better understand-
ing of the progression of monetary convergence prior to the implementation of a 
monetary union. We focus on the launch of the euro as the most prominent event of 
this kind to this date.  
The basic idea driving our analysis is that since the beginning of a monetary 
union all participating currencies are in effect identical, the convergence process to 
this identity should therefore be reflected in the participating currencies' risk premium 
prior to monetary union implementation. Foreign currency risk premiums can be in-
terpreted as a gauge of the degree of uncertainty associated with a particular currency. 
In the context of monetary integration, if two currencies were seen as essentially the 
same currency, new arrival of information would cause a move in the same direction 
and magnitude for both currencies; in other words, their risk premium profile would 
be the same.  
We use this principle to first show the evolution of convergence of the risk 
premium of different currencies relative to the German mark risk premium, seen as 
the anchor currency, and second to test the level of asymmetry of the convergence 
between the German and other European currencies or, in other words, the extent to 
which participating currencies' risk premium moved towards that of the German mark 
and vice versa. 
We are able to show through the use of univariate representations of the risk 
premium, obtained through Kalman filtering technology, the paths and speed towards 
convergence of the European currencies participating in EMU. As regards the level of 
asymmetry in the convergence process, it is possible to show, through rolling window 
bivariate causality tests, a clear pattern of asymmetry of the different participating 
currencies in relation to the German mark. This asymmetry does not hold for the 
Dutch guilder, which was seen as proxy for the German mark almost for the entire 
analysed period. The analysis also shows that we cannot exclude the possibility of the 
U.S. playing an indirect role in the European Monetary System through a significant 
relationship between the German mark and U.S. dollar.  
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The methodology presented in the paper may be used as an alternative way for 
looking at the evolution in the formation of currency unions by examining the role of 
possible anchor currency candidates. This proposal could also be useful in the context 
of financial market stability in situations preceding monetary policy integration or in 
situations where new currencies opt to join a monetary union, e.g. new EU entrants 
joining the euro. Possible extensions to the paper could be the analysis of the source 
of risk premium by identifying, for example, country specific risks and common or 
systematic risks of countries participating in monetary unions, the examination of re-
gime-switching models to identify changes in coordination in national monetary poli-
cies and the methodological treatment and analysis of the role of third party curren-
cies (e.g. the US dollar).     
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper studies the relationship of European and non-European currencies 
risk premium in the context of the European Monetary Integration. We study these 
relationships because they can provide a new measure to assess the progression of 
monetary convergence preceding the implementation of a currency (hereafter: mone-
tary) unions. Since from inception of the monetary union, all participating currencies 
are effectively identical, the convergence to this identity should be reflected in the 
participating currencies' risk premiums prior to its implementation.
1  
Some authors have characterized the EMS not as a coordinated system but as 
an asymmetric one dominated by the German Bundesbank [MacDonald and Taylor 
(1991), Hagen and Fratianni (1990)]. This means that the Bundesbank determined its 
monetary policy autonomously and other countries surrendered their monetary policy 
autonomy to the German leadership. One possible explanation given for that behav-
iour is that by linking domestic monetary policy to that of Germany, other countries’ 
policymakers enhanced their own credibility (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). This ar-
gument is known in the literature as the strict or strong German Dominance Hypothe-
sis (GDH) in which national central banks completely surrendered their monetary pol-
icy autonomy to the Bundesbank. Under this hypothesis the relationship between na-
tional central banks and the Bundesbank is seen as unidirectional, running from 
changes in German policy to other EMS members’ policies.  
Another version of this argument is given by the weak form of the GDH. In 
this version a feedback among EMS countries is allowed but Germany continues play-
ing a prominent role [Smeets (1990), Von Hagen and Frantianni (1990)]. Other au-
thors, however, have argued that while Germany does not play a dominant and inde-
pendent role within the EMS, the US interest rate has important causal influences on 
the EMS members' rate in addition to the German rate [Katsimbris and Miller, 1993), 
Artus et al. (1991) and Hassapis et al. (1999)]. Weber (1991) offers an alternative in-
                                                 
1 In the first stage of the monetary integration process participating countries agreed to increase coor-
dination of monetary and fiscal policies. In the second stage, which begun in January 1994, member 
countries worked toward a common monetary policy. During this period the European Monetary Insti-
tute was created. In the last stage which started on January 1
st 1999 the exchange rates of the participat-
ing countries were irrevocably fixed to the Euro. The ECB formulates a common monetary policy for 
the Euro area that is implemented with the help of the member nation’s central banks. A chronology of 
events during the 1992-1998 period can be found in the Appendix A.  
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terpretation of the EMS where there is a bipolar system involving a hard currency 
country, Germany, and a soft currency country, France.  
The empirical evidence in support of the GDH has mainly focused on interest 
rate linkages within the EMS with the purpose of capturing the direction of causation 
[Katsimbris and Miller (1993), Hassapis et al. (1999)]. This is usually done by means 
of bivariate VAR systems, consisting of the German interest rate and the respective 
rate of each of the other EMS member countries or alternatively by trivariate VAR 
models where the interest rate of a third country is introduced (i.e. US interest rate). 
This strategy consists simply in performing standard causality tests in first differenced 
VAR models. However, there are several reasons to be sceptical of the VAR ap-
proach. VAR models like indeed any other econometric model typically include a 
relatively small number of variables relative to the universe of possible variables af-
fecting decision processes and rules out asymmetries by assuming linearity (Evans 
and Kuttner, 1999).   
In this paper, we introduce a new way of looking at the monetary convergence 
process occurred in Europe. We analyse the behaviour of risk premia based on Kal-
man filter estimates during the eventful almost seven years (i.e. 1992-1998) period 
immediately preceding the actual monetary integration occurred on the first of Janu-
ary of 1999.
2  
It is convenient to look at this problem from the point of view of a currency 
external to the European currencies involved in the EMU. We decided to select the 
Japanese currency as such external currency. The Japanese economy has presented 
during this period little correlation with European economies in terms of monetary or 
economic magnitudes. The Japanese currency represents therefore a “third party” that 
has little or nothing to do with the business of monetary integration in Europe and that 
observes the developments taking place in the European area from the distance. The 
role of the US economy, however, has been more ambivalent, showing a more signifi-
cant influence on both the European and Japanese economies.  
                                                 
2 Before the member countries can participate in the third stage of EMU the member countries have to 
satisfy a set of convergence criteria regarding inflation, nominal exchange rates, nominal interest rates, 
and government debt and deficit (Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti, 1998).  
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Foreign currency risk premium series obtained through the Kalman filter ap-
proach provide a sense of the degree of uncertainty associated with a particular cur-
rency. From a rational expectations point of view, if two assets were perceived to be 
the same, a new piece of information arriving to the market would cause them to 
move in the same direction. In a process of monetary convergence like the one ex-
perienced in Europe, we could use the same principle. If two currencies were seen as 
essentially the same currency, new arrival of information would cause a move in the 
same direction for both currencies. The German mark and the Dutch guilder are an 
example case within the EMS since they presented a very strong risk premium co-
movement during the years preceding monetary union.  
We show that although the German mark and the rest of European currencies 
risk premium series behaved differently at the beginning of the process they eventu-
ally converged at the end. We show evidence supporting at least the weak form of the 
GDH where European currencies risk premium converge towards the same level of 
risk premium but with the German mark risk premium playing a more prominent role. 
We are able to show the intermediate paths followed by the member currencies before 
actual integration and the relative speed of convergence to monetary union and in this 
way, determine the path of convergence to monetary union over time.  
The presentation of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the theo-
retical foundations of the paper and lay down the main definitions used. In section 2, 
we also relate the existence of risk premium in foreign currency markets to the for-
ward rate puzzle, which is the rejection of the forward price as an unbiased estimate 
of the future spot price (Fama, 1984). In section 3, we present a brief description of 
the Kalman filtering methodology used to extract the risk premium and the general 
structure of our experiments. Data description and presentation of our empirical re-
sults comprise section 4 with conclusions closing in section 5. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
We capitalize from the extensive empirical research done on foreign currency 
risk premium. Conditional on the hypothesis that the foreign exchange market is effi-
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the literature by Fama (1984), Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Hsieh (1984) and Frankel 
(1982). Consider the logarithm of a forward foreign exchange rate observed at time t 
to be delivered at t+1 and denote it by t f . This forward rate can be divided into an ex-
pected future spot rate component and a risk premium component 
 
t t t t rp s E f − = + ) ( 1 ,                                                          (1) 
 
where ) ( 1 + t t s E  is the rational or efficient forecast of the logarithm of the spot ex-
change rate at t+1, conditional on all information available at t, and  t rp  is a premium 
term that is unobservable. The meaning of  t rp  can be put in the context of an equilib-
rium model of international asset pricing described in Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) 
or Roll and Solnik (1977). Adding and subtracting  1 + t s  to the right hand side of equa-
tion (1) and defining  ) ( 1 1 1 + + + − = t t t t s E s v  we obtain 
 
1 1 + + + = − t t t t v rp f s ,                                                                   (2) 
 
where  1 + t v  is a white noise error uncorrelated with past information. The left side of 
equation (2) is the excess return,  1 + t er , and is decomposed into an unobservable risk 
premium component and a white noise error. We implement a methodology based in 
the work of Kalman (1960) from the engineering literature to identify and measure 
risk premium in the pricing of forward foreign exchange that involves application of 
signal-extraction techniques.
3 Within the Kalman filtering technique we refer to the 
risk premium component, rpt, as the signal that we would like to capture and to the 
white noise process, vt+1, as noise that is added to the signal.  
  Excess returns can be equivalently written in the following form 
 




t t t t t rp v f s E s E s f s er + = − + − = − = + + + + + + 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) (        (3) 
 
                                                 
3 See also Wolff (1987).  
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t E  is the market’s expectation conditional upon current information that 
can be different from the statistical expectation,  ) (⋅ t E . Equation (3) states that excess 
returns are the sum of the market forecast error and the risk premium. In the case the 
uncovered interest parity holds and the market’s expectation equals the statistical pre-
diction of the exchange rate, then predictable excess returns must be equal to zero.  
However, many empirical studies have found that predicted excess returns are 
significantly different from zero and that the excess return sign changes. For example, 
Fama (1984) estimated the following equation 
 
1 1 0 1 ) ( + + + − + = ∆ t t t t u s f s β β .                        (4) 
 
His test regressed the change in the exchange rate on the forward premium. If 
predictable excess returns are zero, then  t  t t f s E = + ) ( 1 and  1 1 = β  and 0 0 = β .
4 Fama 
(1984) used the dollar exchange rate against the German mark, British pound and 
Japanese yen over the period 1975 to 1989 to found that the estimates of  1 β  were in 
fact significantly less than one and negative. He also showed that the variance of pre-
dictable returns is greater than the variance of the expected change in the exchange 
rate itself when  2 1 1 < β . These results are typical of many other studies examining 
the same relationship.
5 What can explain that expected excess returns are significantly 
different from zero and that their variance is quite large relative to expected exchange 
rate changes? A great deal of research has been focused on this issue. Generally, there 
are two types of explanations: (a) foreign exchange risk premium, or (b) expectational 
errors. The Fama (1984) test in equation (4) can be used to see how explanations fall 
into these two groups. If we define the risk premium as 
 




t t s f s E f s E rp − − ∆ = − ≡ + + ,                     (5) 
                                                 
4 An alternative test is the linear projection equation given by 
1 1 0 1 1 ) ( + + + + − + = − = t t t t t t u s f b b f s er . Note that this regression is equivalent to equation (4) 
where  1 1 1 b + = β and  0 0 b = β . If predictable excess returns are zero then b1 = 0. 
5 Bossaerts and Hillion (1991), Bekaert and Hodrick (1993). In fact, this simple test has produced a 
challenge for researcher in the field of international finance and as Lewis (1995) put it, it is considered 
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and define the changes in the exchange rate as 
 
1 1 1 ) ( + + + + ∆ = ∆ t t t t s E s ε ,                         (6) 
 
where ) (⋅ t E  denotes the statistical expectation and  1 + t ε  is a white noise error uncor-
related with past information.  
Equation (5) states that the markets expected return for holding foreign depos-
its is an equilibrium premium paid for taking more risk. The market’s forecast error is 
 
1 1 1 ) ( + + + = ∆ − ∆ t t
m
t t v s E s ,                         (7) 
 
and the excess return can be written as 
 
1 1 + + + = t t t v rp er .                           (8) 
 
If we believe that the behaviour of predictable excess returns found by Fama 
(1984) is due to the risk premium, the expectations made by market participants are 
rational and the market knows the statistical distribution of the economy. In such 
situation,  1 1 + + = t t v ε  so that the predictable excess return is just equal to the risk pre-
mium t rp . An implication of this view is that as pointed out by Fama (1984) the vari-
ance of the risk premium exceeds the variance of the market’s expectations of ex-
sayrp , so that  1 1 + + + = t t v rp er
forecast errors vt+1. Persistence or predictability of forecast errors could rise when 
there is presence of irrational traders in the market or from difficulties in measuring 
expectations of predictable returns when for example the regression equations used to 
change rate changes or expected depreciation. The alternative explanation based on 
expectational errors supposes that the risk premium in equation (8) is constant to 
. In this situation the higher variation of expected excess
return found in the Fama (1984) paper must rise from predictable movements in the  
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measure expectations may not accurately reflect the market’s expectation of returns
6. 
Although both groups of explanations are usually given as mutually exclusive they 
can be combined to yield the behaviour of predictable excess returns showed in Fama 
(1984).
7  
In this paper we will take the view that time-varying risk premium is the 
source of predicted excess return
8. We therefore imply that market participants act 
rationally and that they demand an equilibrium premium paid for taking more risk 
when holding foreign deposits. This in turn implies that model forecast errors must be 
uncorrelated with everything in the lagged information set.  
 
 
3.  Methodology  
 
Since we focus our analysis on the behaviour of time-varying risk premium we 
should find a way to model it. With this aim we implement a methodology to identify 
and measure risk premium in the pricing of forward foreign exchange that involves 
application of signal-extraction techniques. This methodology is based in the work of 
Kalman (1960) from the engineering literature
9. Kalman filtering models have been 
used in the extraction of time-varying risk premium by Wolff (1987) and Cheung 
(1993). In order to be able to apply the Kalman filter in the context of risk premium 
models described above, the risk premium models have to be arranged in the state 
space form. From equations (3) and (8) we have the following two equations model  
 
1 1 1 + + + + = − ≡ t t t t t v rp f s er ,                         (9) 
 
t t t u rp rp + = −1 φ ,                         (10) 
 
                                                 
6
7 Grossman and Rogoff (1995) give a comprehensive survey of models of time-varying risk premium 
and expectational errors. 
8
9 Other studies are Anderson and Moore (1979) and Harvey (1986). 
 This is usually associated with the so-called peso effect which gets its name from the behaviour of 
 This is also the interpretation given in Fama (1984). Other authors made the same hypothesis, see for 
the Mexican peso in the early 1970s. Peso effects arise when at the time of decision making, investors 
example Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Hodrick and Srivastava (1984) and Hsieh (1984). 
rationally expect the occurrence of a future event that fails to take place.  
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where  1 + t er  is a k×1 vector of observed variables,  t rp  is a k×1 vector of unobservable 
state variables, φ is the state transition matrix, and  1 + t v  and  t u  are vectors of distur-
bance terms. The terms,  t u  and  t v  are independently distributed for all t and r and, ut, 
vr and  r rp are independent for all r ≤ t. Generally, we denote equation (9) as the meas-
urement equation and equation (10) as the state transition equation. Equation (10) de-
notes the generating process for the risk premium that in this case is given by an 
AR(1) process. The specification of a particular model for  t rp  can be based on the 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the forecast error,  t t f s − +1 , 
which should be the same as the combined structure of the risk premium and the 
white noise process,  1 + t v  as in equation (9). Table 2 shows the autocorrelation and 
partial autocorrelation values of the forecast error. The results in Table 2 suggest a 
structure consistent with one of an AR(1) model.
10 An extra assumption is assumed 













































t .                     (11) 
 
The Kalman filter algorithm will allow us to compute the mean and covariance of the 
risk premium,  t rp , on a period-by-period basis. We assume that  t rp  at t = 0 has a 
normal prior distribution with mean  0 0 = t rp  and covariance matrix  0 0 = V . At every 
point in time t, after the excess return has been observed, we want to revise our prior 
distribution of the unknown state vector  t rp . Given the knowledge of  0 rp ,  0 V , Q, R 
and φ, the Kalman filter will compute in a recursive manner the mean and covariance 
matrix of  t rp  for each time period. Given the normality assumptions above, the con-
ditional distributions  ) | ( t t er rp p  and  ) | ( 1 1 + + t t er rp p  are also normal distributions that 
can be characterized by their first two moments; the mean,  ) ( t t rp E  and its covariance 
matrix ) ( t t rp V . See appendix B for an exposition of the recursive Kalman Filter es-
timation procedure used in the analysis. 
                                                 
10 This is equivalent to a ARMA(1,0) model where the white noise sequence, ut+1, can be interpreted as 
a MA(0) process.  
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4.  Data and Empirical Results 
 
Our data consists of daily prices of nominal exchange rates and nominal inter-
est rates of 11 currencies. The foreign exchange rates are German mark (dem), U.S. 
dollar (usd), U.K. pound (gbp), Irish pound (iep), Swedish krona (sek), Dutch guilder 
(nlg), Belgian franc (bef), French franc (frf), Italian lira (itl), Finnish markka (fim) 
and Spanish peseta (esp). Both rates are average bid-ask market quotes synchronously 
recorded by the Bank of Finland at 12 noon EET time. The sample period is from the 
beginning of 1992 to June 1998. The implied forward prices are estimated using the 
daily nominal interest rates for a maturity of one month. We assume that that both the 
foreign exchange and interest rate markets are efficient and that no-arbitrage opportu-
nities exist between the rates quoted in the forward and spot prices. An important is-
sue about the calculation of the forecast error or excess return,  t t f s − +1 , is to find the 
right delivery on a forward contract made today. To find the delivery date on a for-
ward contract made today, it is first necessary to determine today's spot value date, 
which is two business days in the future for trades between US dollars, European cur-
rencies or the Japanese yen. Delivery on a 30-day forward contract occurs on the cal-
endar day in the next month that corresponds to the calendar day of the current month 
on which spot value is realized if this day is a working business day. If it is a weekend 
or a holiday, one takes the next available business day without going out of the 
month. In the case we have to go out of the month we take the first previous business 
day. This general rule is followed except when the spot value day is the last business 
day of the current month in which case the forward value day is the last business day 
of the next month.
11 Unless one matches the forward rate with the appropriate spot 
error is introduced into the analysis.  
                                                 
11 Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) consider the use of the wrong future spot rate as one source of meas-
rate, a true return on the forward contract is not being calculated and measurement 
urement error in testing the Fama (1984) relationships. Another source of bias is to fail in accounting 
for the bid-ask spread in the recorded market data. They found, however, that the bid-ask spread bias
was negligible when testing for the Fama equations.    
16
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 569
December 2005
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the whole period of the excess re-
turn,  t t f s − +1 , the depreciation rates,  t t s s − +1  and forward premiums,  t t s f − .
12 The 
values for the mean and variance statistics are on a percent per month basis since the 
forward spot rates are in logs and multiplied by 100. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 
excess returns are different from zero. Panel B of Table 1 exhibits the statistics of de-
preciation rate from the estimation period. The mean of depreciation of the Japanese 
yen is positive against the U.S. dollar and British pound and marginally positive for 
the French franc whereas for the rest of currencies the depreciation is negative. Note 
from Panel A and B that excess return variances,  t t f s − +1 , are marginally smaller than 
the variances of the depreciation rates,  t t s s − +1 , for almost all the currencies. This in-
dicates that in terms of variance of forecast errors, the current forward rate is a mar-
ginally better predictor of the future spot rate than the current spot rate. Panel C in 
Table 1 presents general statistics of the forward premiums,  t t s f − . Note that if 
t t i i >
* , that is if interest rates in the foreign currency are higher than interest in Japa-
nese yen, the forward premium becomes negative which indeed has been the case dur-
ing the analysed period.. The reported kurtosis and skewness coefficients are both 
zero under the null. Normality of returns of excess returns, t t f s − +1 , the depreciation 
rates,  t t s s − +1  and forward premiums,  t t s f − , are rejected for all currencies. 
Table 2 shows autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations functions of excess 
returns as defined in equation (3). Traditional Box and Jenkins (1976) procedures of 
identification can be applied to identify a correct time series model for excess returns. 
The autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations are consistent with an AR(1) proc-
ess. Recall that this AR(1) model also represents the combination of the risk premium 
plus noise processes. Using a summation theorem for moving-average processes in 
Ansley et al. (1977) we can conclude that the excess return is consistent with a AR(1) 
model for the risk premia.  
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the state-space models for risk premia are 
presented in Table 3. The results in Table 3 are based on the entire sample. First, in all 
cases the variance of the premium term is greater than the variance of the noise term. 
                                                 
12 Note that by definition the excess return equals the difference between future depreciation  t t s s − +1  
and forward premium  t t s f − , i.e.  ) ( ) ( 1 1 t t t t t s f s s f s − − − = − + +   
17
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Note that the risk premiums,  t rp , are positively correlated with the unexpected 
change of the future spot rates,  t v . Intuitively, that means that the greater the risk 
premium, the greater the unexpected depreciation. The relative hyperparameter val-
ues, given as q-ratios, show the signal to noise ratio. All currencies present low signal 
to noise ratios. In the sample, the British pound has the biggest risk premium mean. 
When we multiply by 12 to make the figure comparable to interest rates computed per 
year the annualised risk premium for the British pound is 5.16%. Risk premiums cal-
culated in this way give an indication of the average levels of time varying risk pre-
mia that are possible in the foreign forward exchange market.  
The value denoted by r(1) gives the residual autocorrelation at lag 1. In the 
same way, the Durbin Watson statistic gives an indication of the degree of first order 
serial correlation in the residuals. Both statistics show no sign of residual serial corre-
lation giving strong indication that the proposed model is adequately capturing the 
dynamic structure of all currency series.  
 
 
4.1.  The Evolution of Foreign Currency Risk Premium 
 
The main purpose of this paper is not only to estimate risk premium series in 
the foreign forward currency market but also to study their evolution through time so 
that we can visualise the convergence process of the projected monetary union taking 
place. By analysing the developments of the risk premia series obtained through Kal-
man filtering methodology we can investigate the speed and the direction of the con-
vergence process. 
Figure 1 shows the rolling window correlations of the German mark risk pre-
mium series with other currencies’ risk premium series. The size of the window is 
fixed to 250 trading days. The moving correlation of the risk premium series converge 
to perfect correlation towards the end of the sample for those currencies participating 
in the final stage of the Monetary Union. On May 3
rd of 1998 Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain joined the Euro. It is interesting to see from Figure 1 that there is a clear proc-
ess of comovement with the German mark risk premium well before that date. Spain, 
Italy and Finland manifest an increasingly higher comovement with Germany since  
18
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the beginning of 1997 but prior to that date their risk premium correlation behaves in 
a somewhat erratic fashion. Foreign exchange markets perceived during 1997 an in-
creasing likelihood of these countries participating in the final stage of EMU. The 
case of France is an interesting one. Figure 1 shows that the degree of comovement of 
the French risk premium with that of Germany was never below the 92% mark. How-
ever, it is not until the end of 1997 when the rate of comovement becomes almost 
100%.  The Netherlands present an almost perfect correlation with German risk pre-
mia right from the start of the sample and Belgium joins this pair around the begin-
ning of 1995.  
The visualisation of the comovement of risk premium series for the currencies 
that finally entered the currency union also indicates that in effect there was already 
an almost perfect comovement among these currencies well before the starting date of 
EMU. In some cases, like the Dutch guilder and Belgium franc, this almost perfect 
comovement with the German mark was evident since 1992 for the guilder and late 
1994 for the Belgium franc.  Assuming a 250 days rolling window and benchmark 
correlation at the level of 98-99%, it is also possible to pinpoint the approximate dates 
when the remaining participating currencies joined the German mark, Dutch guilder 
and Belgium franc group of currencies: for the French franc this can be considered to 
have occurred at around April 1997, for the Spanish peseta at around July 1997, for 
the Finnish markka at around December 1997 and for the Italian lira in early January 
1998. 
13 
The British pound presents a quite unstable correlation with the German mark 
in the range of 60% and 90% over the analysed period, and a sharply decreasing cor-
relation just at the end of the period. The US dollar risk premium, in turn, also shows 
a volatile correlation pattern with that of the German mark with a somewhat higher 
but still volatile correlation just at the end of the period.   
The Irish currency traditionally linked to the British pound presents a diver-
gent pattern to that of Britain in terms of risk premium correlations within the preced-
ing two years before start of phase three of EMU. In this sense, the data tends to sup-
port the view that the market started to see the Irish pound as a different entity, closer 
                                                 
13 This in effect means that over the prior 250 days the level of comovement has been very high as to 
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to the risk premia behaviour of continental European currencies.
14 However, unlike 
other participating currencies, the Irish pound did not achieve the pattern of almost 
perfect comovement described above for other participating currencies at least not 
until the end of the considered period of analysis.
15 
Finally, the Swedish krona risk premium correlation with that of the German 
mark is an interesting case to discuss as Sweden opted in December 1997 not to intro-
duce the single currency from the start of EMU. The data tends to suggest that the 
level of comovement was increasing from the end of 1996 up to the end of 1997 when 
it reached the 90% correlation mark. However, when the political decision to not enter 
EMU was finally known the upward trend in the co movement of risk premium 
stopped, commencing a decreasing trend, although it maintained a relatively high 
level further on.
16     
Figure 1 is also able to show some of the major events that occurred in the pe-
riod on the road to monetary union such as monetary storms during 1993 and devalua-
tion in March of 1995 of the Spanish peseta and Portuguese escudo.
17 The ability of 
risk premia series to identify these major events in the form of a decrease in the level 
of correlation is noteworthy and reassuring.  
                                                 
14 Rolling window correlations of the UK pound and US dollar risk premium with the other currencies 
used in the analysis were also computed and are available on request. In particular, the UK pound cor-
relations with other EMS currencies show a very significant decrease at the end of the analysed period 
and this decrease is even more pronounced with the Irish pound.  
15 It is to be reminded that the Irish pound was subject to a high degree of uncertainty about the entry 
rate to EMU (see for example Honohan (1997)). By March 14 1998, a revaluation of the currency of 
3% took place. Although, on the 3
rd of May of 1998 the exchanges rates were irrevocably fixed to the 
Euro, the level of comovement during the 250 days prior to the exchange fixing date show this high 
but imperfect correlation for the Irish pound and the German mark.  
16 While much of the Swedish establishment was in favour of EMU, economic experts and public opin-
ion was divided. The Riksdag decision in December 1997 left open the door for a later Swedish par-
ticipation in the monetary union recommending stability oriented economic policy (see Gottfries 2002 
for a more detailed account of events). In any case, the Swedish krona has moved in broad terms in 
step with the Euro since its inception.   
17 The year 1992 is not shown since we use 250 days past observations to compute the rolling window 
correlations.   
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4.2.  The Directional (A)symmetry of Convergent Risk Premia  
 
The analysis in Figure 1 presented evidence on the convergence process that 
took place in Europe during the 1992-1998 periods. However, this analysis gives little 
indication on whether this convergence process was an asymmetric or symmetric one, 
i.e. whether European currencies risk premium converged to the German currency 
risk premium or that German risk premium and other European currency risk premi-
ums moved towards each other. Indeed, the apparent convergence of European cur-
rencies risk premium to the German risk premium shown in Figure 1 may be un-
founded. It is very possible that what was really happening was that the German risk 
premium was converging towards the risk premium of other participating currencies. 
To shed light on this matter we propose a bivariate causality model to test whether the 
past distance between the German risk premium and currency’s X risk premium affect 
future variations of currency’s X risk premium. Formally we estimate the following 
model 
 






i t DEM rp X rp X rp X rp ε θ φ + − + ∆ = ∆ −
=
−




1 ,             (12) 
 






i t DEM rp X rp DEM rp DEM rp ξ θ φ + − + ∆ = ∆ −
=
−




2 ,      (13) 
 
where ) (X rpt denotes the risk premium in time t of currency X and ∆ is the first dif-
ference operator. 
This model in first differences presents the short-term dynamic characteristics 
of the convergence process. Changes in the risk premium of currency X depends on 
past changes of its own risk premium and on the convergence component given by the 
parameter θ  that captures the m-lagged distance between its risk premium and the 
German risk premium. A simple F-test can be used to determine whether the m-
lagged values of the risk premium distance contribute significantly to the explanatory  
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power of both regressions in equations (12) and (13).
18 If the risk premium distance or 
convergence component does contribute significantly we can reject the null hypothe-
sis that the “convergence component”, [] 1 ) ( ) ( − − t DEM rp X rp , does not affect changes 
in risk premium. Note that we run this test for both equations. To conclude that the 
convergence component affect changes in the risk premium of currency X, we must 
reject the hypothesis “convergence towards German risk premium does not affect 
changes in currency X risk premium” and accept the hypothesis “convergence towards 
X currency risk premium does not affect changes in German risk premium”. Note that 
the numbers of lags m in equations (12) and (13) is arbitrary and boils down to a ques-
tion of judgment. In this paper, we run the tests for a few different values of m to 
make sure that the results are not sensitive to the choice of this parameter. Also, note 
that this is a very simple test and many authors have pointed out several weaknesses. 
One possible difficulty is that a third variable Z might in fact be causing changes in 
currency X risk premium but might also be contemporaneously correlated with the 
convergence component in equations (12) and (13).
19 In fact, when we say that a par-
ticular variable causes another within this hypothesis context we are actually meaning 
precedence and higher information content of that variable and not causality in the 
more common sense of the term. Another possible difficulty is that non-stationary 
variables enter the regression equations affecting the proper interpretation of the p-
values associated to the F-tests (Banerjee, Dolado, Mestre, 1998). Non-stationary 
conditions in the risk premium series were rejected for all currencies allowing for the 
use of the p-statistic of the proposed test. 
Figure 2 shows the result of 300 days rolling window F-tests for equations 
(12) and (13). They show the associated p-values of the F-tests. The tests are calcu-
lated for a value of m equal to 1 so the models capture the very short-term dynamics 
of the behaviour of changes in risk premium. Low p-values indicate that we can reject 
                                                 
18








− = , where ESSR and ESSUR are the sums of squared residuals in the re-
stricted and unrestricted regressions respectively, N is the number of observations, k is the number of 
estimated parameters in the unrestricted regression and q is the number of parameter restrictions. The 
statistic is distributes as F(q, N-k).  
19 See for example Jacobi et al. (1979), Granger (1988) and Zellner (1988) for a critical examination of 
causality tests.  
 The test involves the estimation of an unrestricted regression as in equations (12) and (13) and a re- 
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the null hypothesis that the “convergence component”, [] 1 ) ( ) ( − − t DEM rp X rp , does 
not affect changes in risk premium. On the contrary, higher p-values, say more than 
5%, indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
The virtue of Figure 2 is that it allows to examine the changing behaviour of 
causation during the 1992-1998 periods. Let’s take for example the French franc case 
in Figure 2. There is a strong support for the view of German risk premium levels af-
fecting the French risk premium but not vice versa. Indeed the p-values of the F-test 
for the French franc regression are below the 5% mark for almost the entire second 
half of the sample starting approximately at the end of 1995 and corresponding p-
values for the German regression are high for practically the entire sample. Before 
December 1995 p-values are around the 20% level for the French regression but with 
two major shifts upwards, one around the 1992-93 periods and the second in the 
spring of 1995. The years 1992 and 1993 were an eventful period in the EMS.
20 These 
events are associated with periods of decreasing rates of policy coordination and de-
clining perception in the markets of the accomplishment of a future monetary union. 
In this sense, periods of uncertainty mean for the French franc lower intensity in the 
effort of convergence towards the German mark.  
In the case of the Dutch and German relationship depicted in Figure 2, none of 
the currencies seem to be affected by the convergence component. This means that 
both currencies have achieved a high degree of integration with a perceived risk pre-
mium evolution that is seen as equal. The rest of currencies participating in the EMS 
show a clear pattern of asymmetry in relation to the German mark with the exception 
of the Irish pound. In the case of the Irish pound, it is an indication that perhaps a 
third factor plays a role (e.g. the British pound) and that in terms of risk premium Ire-
land had not converged yet which is corroborated by the visualisation of the rolling 
window correlations analysed in the previous section.  
The British pound shows a different pattern. For the British pound we can not 
reject the null of no causation at the beginning of the sample but this relation changes 
into one of causation from the end of 1996. Conversely, the German mark goes from a 
position of being explained by the convergence component in the middle of the sam-
ple to a position of no rejection of the null at the end of the period.  
                                                 
20 See the appendix A for a chronology of events in the EMS during the 1992-1998 period.  
23
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 569
December 2005
Now, it is interesting to examine the relationship between the U.S. and Ger-
man currencies. Hassapis et al. (1999) have suggested that U.S. monetary policy may 
influence German monetary policy and in turn other national central banks’ policy. 
Indeed, Figure 2 shows that for the most part of the sample these currencies have an 
effect on each other. This gives support to the view that the relative position of the 
German mark with the US dollar is important for both currencies. In this case, we 
cannot talk about integration as in the Dutch and German case since the degree of 
comovement of the U.S. and German currencies is much less than for the Dutch-
German case. In view of this result we cannot exclude the possibility of the U.S. play-




5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper was set to investigate the relationship of European and non-
European currencies risk premium in the context of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). Using estimated currency risk premium series we introduce a new way of 
looking at currency and monetary integration. We analyse the behaviour of risk pre-
mium based on Kalman filter estimates during the eventful seven years period imme-
diately preceding the actual monetary integration occurred on the first of January of 
1999 (i.e. 1992-1998). The analysis is conducted from the point of view of a currency 
external to the European currencies involved in the EMU, the Japanese yen. 
Foreign currency risk premium series obtained through the Kalman filter ap-
proach provide a sense of the degree of uncertainty associated with a particular cur-
rency. In the context of monetary integration, if two currencies were seen as essen-
tially the same currency, new arrival of information would cause a move in the same 
direction and magnitude for both currencies, in other words, their risk premium pro-
file would be the same. The methodology is based on the simple principle of consider-
ing the estimated risk premium as the right indicator for the risk profile of the curren-
cies analysed. The analysis, therefore, implies that market participants act rationally 
and that they demand an equilibrium premium paid for taking more risk when holding 
                                                 
21 A more elaborated approach would be necessary to quantify the extent of influence of the US dollar 
on participating currencies and indeed on the overall currency integration process, through for example 
the introduction of trivariate or multivariate system of equations. This is not attempted in this occasion 
and it is left open for further research.  
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foreign deposits. We use this principle to first show the evolution of convergence of 
the risk premium of different currencies relative to the German mark risk premium, 
seen as the anchor currency, and second to test the level of asymmetry of the conver-
gence between the German and other European currencies. 
We are able to show through the use of univariate representations of the risk 
premium, obtained through Kalman filtering technology, the paths and speed towards 
convergence of the European currencies participating in EMU. As regards the level of 
asymmetry in the convergence process, it is possible to show through rolling window 
bivariate causality tests, a clear pattern of asymmetry of the different participating 
currencies in relation to the German mark. This asymmetry does not hold for the 
Dutch guilder, which was seen as proxy for the German mark almost for the entire 
analysed period. The analysis also shows that we cannot exclude the possibility of the 
U.S. playing an indirect role in the EMS through a significant relationship between 
the German mark and U.S. dollar. 
The methodology presented in the paper may be used as an alternative way for 
looking at the evolution in the formation of currency unions by examining the role of 
possible anchor currency candidates. This proposal could be useful in the context of 
financial market stability in situations preceding monetary policy integration or in 
situations where new currencies opt to join a monetary union, e.g. new EU entrants 
joining the Euro. Possible extensions to the paper could be the analysis of the source 
of risk premium by identifying, for example, country specific risks and common or 
systematic risks of countries participating in monetary unions, the examination of re-
gime-switching models to identify changes in coordination in national monetary poli-
cies and the methodological treatment and analysis of the role of third party curren-
cies (e.g. the US dollar).     
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The European Monetary System (EMS) was created in March 1979 with the purpose to promote monetary 
stability and closer economic cooperation in the countries of the European Community. The Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) was at the core of the system. With the advent of the Euro the ERM was revised. The ERM 
was designed to keep currencies trading in a range around a central rate. After the crises in 1993, the bands 
were widened to 15% for all except the DEM and NLG, which maintained 2.25% bands. At the end of 1996, 
the grid included 12 European Union currencies. Britain’s pound, Sweden’s krona and Greece’s drachma re-





                                                                1992 
February 7  Maastricht Treaty signed by EU finance and foreign ministers. 
April 6  Portuguese escudo enters ERM with 6% bands. 
June 2  Danes vote no to the Maastricht Treaty, with 50.7% against, awakening market doubts about 
EMU and launching months of ERM turmoil. 
June 3  France announces autumn referendum on Maastricht. 
July 16  Bundesbank announces discount rate rise to record 8.75%. 
June 19  Ireland votes in favour of Maastricht, with 68.7% in favour. 
September 3  UK treasury borrows 16 billion ECU to defend the pound within ERM. 
September 4  Italy raises official rates by 1.75 points to defend lira. 
September 5  EU finance ministers stress they have no plans for ERM realignment. 
September 8  Finland severs markka’s link to ECU. Sweden raises interest rates. 
September 10  British Prime Minister John Major rules out devaluation within ERM. 
September 13  First major realignment of the ERM since January 1987; behind-the-scenes deal trades lira de-
valuation to 802.49 per mark for Deutsche interest rate cuts. 
September 14  Bundesbank announces modest rate cuts; market sells pound and lira. 
September 16   “Black Wednesday.” Markets force pound, lira and peseta below ERM floors. Central banks 
intervene. Britain announces unprecedented two-stage rise in base rate from 10% to 15%, then 
suspends pound from ERM and cuts base rate to 12%. Sweden hikes overnight rate to 500%. 
September 17  After a six-hour meeting, EU’s monetary committee suspends lira from ERM. Peseta devalued by 
5%. Britain cuts base rate to 10%. 
September 20  French voters approve Maastricht treaty, with 51.05% in favour. 
September 23  France and Germany launch counter-offensive against currency speculation. Exchange controls 
imposed temporarily in Ireland, Spain and Portugal. 
November 19  Sweden abandons efforts to peg krona to the ECU, renewing turmoil. 
November 22  Peseta, escudo devalued. Markets attack Irish pound, Danish krona, and French franc. 




                                                                1993 
January 1  EU single market begins; Ireland, Spain, Portugal lift exchange controls. 
January 7  Ireland raises overnight interest rates to 100%. 
January 30  Ireland devalues the pound by 10%, biggest single ERM devaluation. 
February 1  Central Bank intervention deflects market attention from Danish krona. 
April  Bank of France starts suggesting franc might share mark’s anchor role in ERM. 
April 19  EU finance ministers unveil 35 billion ECU plan to create jobs. 
May 13   Peseta and escudo devalued. 
May 18  Danish vote in favour of Maastricht treaty at second referendum.  
June 21  French intervention rate below Deutsche discount rate, first time in 23 years. 
June21/22  EU summit in Copenhagen calls for quick cuts in European interest rates. 
July 12  Bundesbank intervenes to buy French francs. 
July 29  Bundesbank ignores market speculation it will cut its discount rate to save the ERM, shaves half 
a point off less important Lombard rate instead. 
July 30  Central banks fail to stop repeated French franc dips below ERM floor. 
August 1  Emergency meeting of finance ministers and central bankers. After 12 hours of talks, early in the 
morning of August 2 they widen bands for all ERM currencies except the mark and guilder to 
15%. Mark and guilder maintain 2.25% range. 
November 1  German constitutional court rules in favour of Maastricht Treaty. 
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                                                                   1994 
January 1   Stage Two of EMU starts; European Monetary Institute (EMI) founded in Frankfurt. 
September 6  Germany’s ruling CDU party suggests core countries launch EMU in 1999. 




                                                                   1995 
January 1  Austria, Finland and Sweden join EU. 
January 8  Austrian schilling joins the ERM with 15% fluctuation bands. 
March 6  Peseta, escudo devalued. 
May 8  Jacques Chirac elected French president. 




                                                                   1996 
October 14  Finland joins the ERM with 15% fluctuation bands. 
November 24  European finance ministers and central bankers compromise on lira-entry to ERM at 990 per 




                                                                   1997 
April 15  EMI issues annual report expressing concern that many EU states had not managed to rein in 
national deficits enough to launch euro as planned in 1999. 
June  1  French left win snap two-round election. Socialist leader Lionel Jospin, who had previously 
voiced concerns about the social effects of tight fiscal policy, forms new government and subse-
quently endorses EMU.  
July  Asian economic crisis begins in earnest with devaluation of the Thai baht. Financial turmoil in 
Asian countries rages throughout the second half of 1997. EU officials repeatedly say that apart 
from dampening overall economic growth the crisis poses no threat to the European economy or 
to EMU. 
September 26  Britain becomes subject of intense speculation as the Financial Times newspaper reports the gov-
ernment plans to announce sterling is likely to join EMU early after 1999 euro launch. The report 
quotes an unnamed minister, and government offices call it speculation but British stock and 
bond markets surge.  
October 27  British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown tells parliament Britain will not join a single 
currency before next election, due by 2002, but he says Britain in principle approves of EMU and 




                                                                   1998 
March 14  European authorities approve Greek drachma entry into ERM and simultaneous revaluation of 
Irish pound. Greek drachma enters ERM with 15% fluctuation bands. The Irish Pound is revalued 
by 3%. 
March 25  European Commission recommends 11 members for EMU after evaluating economic perform-
ance in 1997. On same day, EMI says all EMU candidates must do more to consolidate public 
finances. 
March 27  Bundesbank says it has serious concerns about Italy and Belgium achieving fiscal sustainability 
but that 1999 launch of euro remains justifiable in stability terms. 
May 2-3  European leaders due to hold summit. Expectations are that they will select Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain to 
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Table 1.  Summary statistics of forward and spot exchange rates. 
 
 
Panel A.                Statistic: Excess Returns ) ( 1 t t f s − +   
Currency Mean  Variance    Skewness Kurtosis          ρ1 
dem  0.2827 0.1035  -0.2486  0.0896  0.9601 
usd  0.3884 0.1142  -0.3449  0.6788  0.9586 
gbp  0.4353 0.1695  -1.1831  2.7604  0.9668 
esp  0.1970 0.1534  -0.7924  1.8878  0.9651 
nlg  0.2673 0.1032  -0.2352  0.0964  0.9604 
iep  0.3368 0.1422  -0.8822  1.7928  0.9625 
itl  0.2522 0.1991  -1.1866  3.1790  0.9693 
fim  0.2027 0.1667  -1.4311  4.4348  0.9611 
frf  0.3738 0.1102  -0.1929  0.1015  0.9616 
sek  0.2325 0.1841  -0.6813  0.8676  0.9641 
bef  0.3061 0.1045  -0.3041  0.1661  0.9590 
 
  Panel B.                Statistic: Depreciation Rate  ) ( 1 t t s s − +  
Currency          Mean    Variance   Skewness  Kurtosis           ρ1 
dem  -0.0148 0.1043  -0.2562  0.0835  0.9604 
usd  0.1455 0.1105  -0.3948  0.8263  0.9572 
gbp  0.0223 0.1672  -1.2219  2.9213  0.9663 
esp  -0.4107 0.1568  -0.8251  1.9064  0.9660 
nlg  -0.0142 0.1039  -0.2442  0.0917  0.9606 
iep  -0.1004 0.1433  -0.9077  1.9059  0.9629 
itl  -0.3952 0.2012  -1.2604  3.5006  0.9695 
fim  -0.1633 0.1709  -1.5057  4.8259  0.9622 
frf  0.0024 0.1115  -0.2217  0.0906  0.9622 
sek  -0.2812 0.1864  -0.7164  0.9090  0.9647 
bef  -0.0174 0.1048  -0.3208  0.1384  0.9592 
 
  Panel C.                Statistic: Forward Premium  ) ( t t s f −  
Currency        Mean    Variance   Skewness   Kurtosis          ρ1 
dem  -0.2975 5.90E-05  -0.8677  -0.4491  0.9819 
usd  -0.2428 4.28E-04  0.4555  -1.4800  0.9963 
gbp  -0.4129 1.52E-04  0.2095  -1.3046  0.9848 
esp  -0.6078 3.74E-04  -1.1452  2.4806  0.9748 
nlg  -0.2815 5.45E-05  -1.0880  0.1939  0.9835 
iep  -0.4372 1.75E-04  -2.3454  10.5910  0.9779 
itl  -0.6474 3.08E-04  -1.7502  5.9591  0.9722 
fim  -0.3660 4.05E-04  -1.9635  3.9227  0.9921 
frf  -0.3714 2.00E-04  -1.4703  2.7169  0.9793 
sek  -0.5138 6.99E-04  -6.4025  57.9611  0.9654 
bef  -0.3235 1.10E-04  -1.7023  4.3085  0.9833 
Note: The forward and spot rates are in logs and the values for mean and variance are on 
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Table 2.  The sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the ex-
cess returns (ert). 
     Autocorrelation 
 
Lag  usd dem  gbp  esp nlg iep itl fim frf  sek  bef
1  0.958 0.960 0.966 0.965 0.960 0.962 0.969 0.961 0.961 0.964 0.959 
2  0.920 0.920 0.933 0.929 0.920 0.925 0.937 0.922 0.922 0.924 0.917 
3  0.884 0.885 0.899 0.898 0.885 0.890 0.909 0.890 0.888 0.891 0.881 
4  0.848 0.850 0.865 0.867 0.850 0.857 0.880 0.859 0.854 0.858 0.846 
5  0.816 0.813 0.831 0.830 0.815 0.824 0.848 0.825 0.817 0.825 0.810 
6  0.778 0.775 0.793 0.791 0.776 0.786 0.813 0.791 0.778 0.790 0.773 
7  0.740 0.732 0.754 0.749 0.734 0.745 0.777 0.749 0.736 0.755 0.731 
8  0.707 0.692 0.717 0.713 0.693 0.706 0.743 0.708 0.696 0.723 0.692 
9  0.674 0.653 0.678 0.676 0.653 0.667 0.709 0.669 0.656 0.693 0.654 
10  0.637 0.611 0.639 0.637 0.612 0.629 0.676 0.630 0.615 0.664 0.613 
 
     Partial autocorrelation 
 
Lag  usd dem  gbp  esp nlg iep itl fim frf  sek  bef
1  0.958 0.960  0.966 0.965  0.960 0.962  0.969  0.961 0.961 0.964 0.959 
2  0.016 -0.018  -0.012 -0.031  -0.018 -0.007  -0.035  -0.013 -0.034 -0.069 -0.031 
3  0.006 0.039 -0.036 0.050  0.035 0.003  0.042  0.057 0.054 0.066 0.050 
4  -0.003 -0.020  -0.024 -0.023  -0.015  0.001  -0.028  0.002 -0.020 -0.009 -0.002 
5  0.018 -0.027  -0.009 -0.086  -0.029 -0.004  -0.060  -0.049 -0.050 -0.024 -0.027 
6  -0.094 -0.051  -0.067 -0.051  -0.053 -0.087  -0.055  -0.019 -0.048 -0.038 -0.039 
7  -0.005 -0.070  -0.057 -0.079  -0.071 -0.070  -0.062  -0.126 -0.073 -0.025 -0.075 
8  0.026  -0.000  0.019 0.050 -0.003 0.001  0.020  -0.007 0.000 0.034 0.008 
9  -0.023 -0.022  -0.040 -0.026  -0.022 -0.025  -0.006  -0.018 -0.021 -0.010 -0.019 
10  -0.059 -0.039 -0.045 -0.030  -0.043 -0.009  -0.009  -0.029 -0.031  0.005 -0.055 
 
 
Table 3.  Maximum likelihood estimates of the risk premium model. 
 
 
  usd dem  gbp esp nlg iep itl fim  frf  sek bef






















Mean(rpt)  0.0038  0.0028  0.0043 0.0019 0.0026 0.0033 0.0025 0.0020 0.0037 0.0023 0.0030 
Mean(vt)
a  0.0124  0.2910  0.3580 0.1530 0.2660 0.3470 0.1470 0.1710 0.3960 0.2000 0.3500 
Var(rpt)  0.0011  0.0009  0.0016 0.0014 0.0009 0.0013 0.0019 0.0015 0.0010 0.0017 0.0009 
Var(vt)
a  0.0073  1.4300  1.9100 1.8600 1.4100 1.8500 2.1300 2.2800 1.4600 2.3400 1.4900 
q-ratio  0.0001  0.0146  0.0074 0.0127 0.0117 0.0137 0.0112 0.0144 0.0140 0.0134 0.0151 
R(1)  0.0004  0.0175  0.0109 0.0294 0.0170 0.0068 0.0034 0.0117 0.0328 0.0675 0.0292 
DW    1.9980  1.9620  1.9770 1.9390 1.9630 1.9840 1.9300 1.9750 1.9310 1.8630 1.9380 
p.e.v.
a  9.2029  7.9259  10.910 10.410 7.8521 10.310 11.920 12.540 8.1329 12.860 8.2281 
ρRP,v 
0.1991  0.1870  0.1797 0.1783 0.1865 0.1821 0.1684 0.1798 0.1853 0.1832 0.1892 
Annual (rpt)  0.0458  0.0336  0.0516 0.0228 0.0312 0.0396 0.0300 0.0240 0.0444 0.0276 0.0360 
Note: The estimated autoregressive AR(1) coefficient is φ. 
a) indicates that numbers are scaled up by 10
5. The basic 
measure of the goodness of fit is p.e.v (prediction error variance) defined as the variance of the one-step ahead 
prediction errors in the steady state. The R(1) is the residual autocorrelation at lag 1, distributed approximately as 
N(0,1/T). DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, distributed approximately as N(2/T). The relative hyperparameter, 
known here as the signal to noise ratio is given as the q-ratio. ρrp,v  is the sample correlation of the risk premium 
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Figure 1.  The rolling (250 days) correlation of the German mark risk premium with 
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Figure 2.  The rolling causality tests between the risk premium of German mark and 












                                                 
23 The graphs show the associated p-values of the F -tests of equations (12) and (13). The size of the 
rolling window is fixed to 300 trading days. Low p-values indicate that we can reject the null hypothe-
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Figure 2.  Continued. The rolling causality test between the risk premium of German   



























                                                 
24 The graphs show the associated p-values of the F -tests of equations (12) and (13). The size of the 
rolling window is fixed to 300 trading days. Low p-values indicate that we can reject the null hypothe-
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Appendix B: The Kalman filter recursive estimation procedure. 
 
The Kalman filter recursions for t=0, 1, 2,…, N are given by the following expres-
sions 
 
() ( ) t t t t rp E rp E φ = +1 ,                          (1) 
() () 1 1 + + = t t t t rp E er E θ ,                         (2) 
() ( )Q rp V rp V t t t t + = +
'
1 φ φ ,                                   (3) 
() () R rp V er D t t t t + = + +
'
1 1 θ θ ,                        (4) 




1 1 1 1 ) ( + +
−
+ + + + + − + = t t t t t t t t t t t t rp E er E er D rp V rp E rp E φ θ ,       (5) 




1 1 1 1 +
−
+ + + + + − = t t t t t t t t t t rp V er D rp V rp V rp V θ θ .                 (6) 
 
The recursive procedure in equations (1) to (6) will calculate the optimal esti-
mator of the state vector,  t rp , given all the information which is available at time t. 
Given the prior information for  0 rp  and  0 V , the Kalman filter produces the optimal 
estimator of the state as each new observation becomes available. When all T observa-
tions have been processed, the estimator  T p rˆ  contains all the information needed to 
make predictions of future observations. After filtering we can use smoothing tech-
niques to take account of the information made available after time t. The smoothed 
estimator
25 is based on more information that the filtered estimator and therefore will 
have generally a smaller mean square error (MSE) than the filtered estimator without 
smoothing. In our paper we use the fixed interval-smoothing algorithm as introduced 
in Harvey (1993). This procedure involves a backward pass of the data through the 
Kalman filter from t = T to t = 1. Finally, in our state space model in equations in the 
main text (9) and (10), the system matrices, Q and R will depend on a set of unknown 
parameters. These will be referred as the hyper parameters. In our particular case of 
an AR(1) model the hyper parameters are 
2
v σ  and 
2
u σ . Using the Kalman filter to 
construct the likelihood function can carry out maximum likelihood estimation of the 
                                                 
25 Harvey (1993) introduces three different smoothing algorithms: the fixed point smoothing, the fixed-
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hyperparameters. For our particular problem Harvey (1993) shows that the log-
likelihood function


























log π ,                  (7) 
 
where  t f  is equal to  ] 1 / ) ( [
2
1 + − v t t rp V σ  and wt is equal to []
2 / 1
1 ) /( )) ( ( t t t t f er E er − − . 
Note that both  t f  and  t w  can be computed using the Kalman filter introduced above. 
In the rest of the paper, maximum likelihood estimates of the premium models will be 
presented based on our model presented in equations (9) and (10). 
                                                 
26 Note that the likelihood function is concentrated over 
2
v σ the variance of the noise term. The impor-
tant characteristic of the likelihood function is that only the ratio of the variance of vt+1 to the variance 
of ut matters for the calculation of premium terms, not the individual variances (Harvey 1993).  
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